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advantage. We develop a two-country New-Keynesian model allowing for sectoral 
differences in the production of tradables: while in one sector firms are perfectly 
competitive, in another sector firms produce differentiated goods under monopolistic 
competition and subject to nominal rigidities, hence their performance is more sensitive 
to macroeconomic uncertainty. We show that, by stabilizing inflation and the output gap, 
monetary policy can foster the competitiveness of these firms, encouraging investment 
and entry in the differentiated goods sector. 
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1.   Introduction 
This paper offers a new perspective on how monetary and exchange rate policy can 
strengthen a country’s international competitiveness. Conventional policy models 
emphasize the competitive gains from currency devaluation, which lowers the relative cost 
of producing in a country over the time span that domestic wages and prices remain sticky. 
In modern monetary theory and central bank practice, however, reliance on devaluation to 
boost competitiveness is not viewed as a viable policy recommendation on two accounts. 
First, it may be interpreted as a strategic beggar-thy-neighbor measure, inviting retaliation 
up to causing currency wars, and second, because of its discretionary nature, it is expected 
to worsen the short-run trade-offs between inflation and unemployment. The New Open 
Economy Macro (NOEM) and New-Keynesian (NK) literature has indeed moved away 
from the conventional policy model, stressing that monetary policymakers can exploit a 
country’s monopoly on its terms of trade. As this typically means pursuing a higher 
international price of home goods, however, desirable policy measures seem to go in the 
opposite direction relative to improving competitiveness.1 In this paper, we take an 
altogether different perspective, and explore the relevance for a country’s comparative 
advantage of adopting monetary and exchange rate regimes which may or may not deliver 
efficient macroeconomic stabilization.  
We motivate our analysis with the observation that monetary policy aimed at 
stabilizing marginal costs and demand conditions at an aggregate level (weakening or 
strengthening the exchange rate in response to cyclical disturbances) is likely to have 
asymmetric effects across sectors. Stabilization policy can be expected to be more 
consequential in industries where firms face significant nominal rigidities and incur 
significant up-front investment to enter the market—features typically associated with 
differentiated manufacturing goods. To the extent that monetary policy ensures domestic 
macroeconomic stability, it creates favorable conditions for firms’ entry in such industries, 
                                               
1 The new-open economy macroeconomics and New-Keynesian literature emphasize a trade-off between 
output gap, defined as the difference between equilibrium  output in the model with distortions and its first-
best level in a world without distortions, and exchange rate stabilization due to a terms-of-trade externality,  
similar to that underlying the optimal tariff argument. For example, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Corsetti 
and Pesenti (2001, 2005), and Canzoneri et al. (2005) in the NOEM literature, as well as Benigno and 
Benigno (2003) and Corsetti et al. (2010) in the New-Keynesian literature, among others. Provided the 
demand for exports and imports is relatively elastic, an appreciation of the terms of trade of manufacturing 
allows consumers to substitute imports for domestic goods, reducing the disutility of labor without 
appreciable effects on the marginal utility of consumption.  
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with potentially long-lasting effects on their competitiveness, and thus on the weight of 
their production in domestic output and exports.  
To illustrate our new perspective on the subject, we specify a stochastic general-
equilibrium monetary model of open economies with incomplete specialization across two 
tradable sectors. In one sector, firms produce an endogenous set of differentiated varieties 
operating under imperfect competition; in the other sector, firms produce highly 
substitutable, non-differentiated goods—for simplicity we assume perfect competition. The 
key distinction between these sectors is that differentiated goods producers face a 
combination of nominal rigidities and sunk entry costs that make them more sensitive to 
macroeconomic uncertainty.  
The key result from our model is that efficient stabilization regimes affect the 
average relative price of a country’s differentiated goods in terms of its non-differentiated 
goods, and, relative to the case of insufficient stabilization, confer comparative advantage 
in the sale of differentiated goods both at home and abroad. Underlying this result is a 
transmission channel at the core of modern monetary literature: in the presence of nominal 
rigidities, uncertainty implies the analog of a risk premium in a firm’s optimal prices, 
depending on the covariance of demand and marginal costs (See Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000, 
Corsetti and Pesenti 2005, and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2011). We show that, by 
impinging on this covariance, and thus on the variability of the ex-post markups, optimal 
monetary policy contributes to manufacturing firms setting prices that, on average, are 
efficiently low and competitive, with a positive demand externality affecting the size of the 
market. A large market in turn strengthens the incentive for new manufacturing firms to 
enter, see e.g., Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2008). An 
implication of the theory that is relevant for policy-related research is that, everything else 
equal, countries with a reduced ability to stabilize macro shocks will tend to specialize 
away from differentiated manufacturing goods, relative to the countries that use their 
independent monetary policy to pursue inflation and output gap stabilization.  
The effect of monetary policy on the composition of output and exports has a key 
implication for the terms of trade of the country. Comparative advantage in manufacturing 
means that, thanks to better stabilization, the country can sell its differentiated goods at a 
competitive, hence lower, price in the global market. However, the fact that it sells more 
manufacturing goods, and imports more non-differentiated goods, means that, overall, the 
terms of trade of the country improve. The importance of this result should not be missed. 
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It shows that one of the key tenets of the New-Keynesian model, concerning the relevance 
of improved terms of trade for the conduct of monetary policy, does not necessarily require 
monetary policy to hamper firms’ price competitiveness, as is the case if the model 
specification is restricted to include only one-tradable good. In this respect, our 
generalization of the model, closer to trade theory, provides a new perspective and new 
foundation to the extant literature. 
Numerical simulations are conducted on a calibrated version of the model, 
including TFP shocks calibrated to novel estimates of the TFP process for differentiated 
and non-differentiated sectors in the U.S.  As a baseline, we characterize the Ramsey 
optimal policy allocation and show that, in terms of welfare levels, the same outcome can 
be supported by policy rules that fully stabilize inflation and output gaps in each country.  
Relative to the Ramsey baseline, our key result is that, when one country replaces the 
optimal stabilization rule with a unilateral exchange rate peg (implying insufficient 
inflation and output gap stabilization), the new regime substantially shifts comparative 
advantage. The country pursuing the peg loses out production and exports of differentiated 
goods to the country that maintains an efficient stabilization regime. In particular, 
compared to the symmetric Ramsey solution, the share of exports in differentiated goods 
falls by 4.5 percentage points in the country pursuing a peg; it rises by a similar amount in 
the country that keeps its inflation stabilization policy. Associated with this relocation of 
exports and production across countries is a substantial shift in firm entry:  the pegger 
experiences a 7% drop in the number of firms in the differentiated goods sector, 
corresponding to a rise in the stabilizing country. Due to the drop in firm entry, the pegging 
country thus accounts for a smaller share of the range of varieties of differentiated goods 
available to consumers in both countries.   
The shift in comparative advantage and production relocation have substantial 
welfare implications at the country level. In our calibration, welfare of the pegging country 
falls 1.8% relative to the Ramsey policy, and the welfare of the stabilizing country rises 
above the Ramsey policy by 1.4%.  These effects are large by the standards of the monetary 
policy literature, but are essentially redistributive: one country’s loss is another country’s 
gain, with overall modest implications for global aggregate welfare. Underlying this result 
are the welfare gains in terms of reduced trade costs, from relocating production of 
differentiated goods to the domestic economy, as discussed by trade literature on the Home 
Market Effect and the production relocation externality (see Ossa, 2011). Our contribution is 
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to show how this externality is relevant not only for trade policy, but also to stabilization 
policy—the more so, the higher the demand and productivity uncertainty faced by firms. 
In this respect, we should stress two key features of our model that are essential to 
derive our main results. The first is the possibility of shifting comparative advantage 
between two tradable sectors, a novel feature in monetary economics. A model 
specification with either one tradable goods sector only, or with one tradable and one 
nontradable sector would not deliver this result. In either specification, each country has a 
set comparative advantage in its own tradable by construction, and, trivially, there can be 
no change in the composition of the bundle of exports in response to fundamental shocks 
and policy. The second is firms’ entry affecting the bundle of goods varieties produced by a 
country, and hence potential gains from saving on trade costs.  Versions of the model that 
exogenously hold constant the number of firms in each country mute the quantitative 
effects of asymmetric stabilization policy on production, exports and welfare.  
Our paper is related to a large open economy macro literature studying optimal 
exchange rate and macroeconomic stabilization policy.  Our specific contribution consists 
of studying the extent to, and the mechanisms by which, this policy affects endogenous 
specialization among multiple traded sectors. As discussed above, we differ from the vast 
majority of the macro literature in that we relax the assumption of one traded goods sector 
only. Even among the small set of papers that, like us, specify economies with more than 
one traded sector, we found no other that allows for endogenous comparative advantage. 
For example, Lombardo and Ravenna (2014) allow for imports of both intermediates and 
final goods, yet they assume that only final goods are exportable. As a result, they can 
analyze how the design of optimal stabilization policy depends on an exogenously given 
composition of trade, but not how this composition of trade may depend on policy.  
Two tradable sectors are of course standard in the set of open economy and 
monetary models focusing on oil price shocks. In many contributions a tradable commodity 
sector coexists with a sticky price differentiated goods sector. However, obvious 
differences relative to our work preclude this literature from studying the comparative 
advantage and production relocation driving our results. Bodenstein et al. (2012) simplifies 
the supply side of the oil sector by assuming an exogenous endowment, which is 
reasonable for studying the oil market, but rules out endogenous specialization. Nakov and 
Pescatori (2010a,b) endogenize the production of oil, but assume a dominant oil exporter 
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(OPEC) that exogenously specializes and exports from the oil sector, again ruling out the 
effect of monetary policy on endogenous specialization.   
From the perspective of trade theory, our analysis is related to work on tariffs by 
Ossa (2011), which nonetheless abstracts from nominal rigidities and other distortions that 
motivate our focus on stabilization policy. Ossa’s paper, like ours, models a country’s 
comparative advantage drawing on the literature dealing with the ‘home market effect’ 
after Krugman (1980), implying production relocation externalities associated with the 
expansion of manufacturing.2 This relationship also applies to recent work by Epifani and 
Gancia (2017), who revisit the ‘transfer problem’ of trade in the context of production 
relocation externalities; again, they do not study monetary policy or consider an 
environment with nominal rigidities.  
Our work is also related to the trade literature studying how various institutions and 
policies, such as labor market regulation or legal frameworks, affect comparative advantage 
between multiple traded sectors. Cunat and Melitz (2012) and Nunn (2007) are two 
examples. With respect to this international trade literature, our paper’s novel contribution 
is to posit that the conduct of monetary policy is another, previously unstudied, institutional 
feature that should be added to the list of those that affect comparative advantage. 
Finally, we note that the mechanisms by which monetary policy may influence 
comparative advantage are of course relevant also for stabilization policies relying on fiscal 
and financial instruments.  Taxes and subsidies may contribute to demand and markup 
stabilization, containing the distortions due to nominal price stickiness and thus, according 
to our core argument, misallocation across sectors. While, everything else equal, inefficient 
monetary stabilization (e.g., deriving from adopting a fixed exchange) may hamper 
comparative advantage in manufacturing, substitution among policy instruments may make 
up for constraints on monetary policy. Our analysis shows a specific reason why exploiting 
a wide range of stabilization instruments is particularly valuable. 
                                               
2 According to the literature stressing the ‘home market effect,’ the social benefits from gaining comparative 
advantage in the manufacturing sector stem from a ‘production relocation externality:’ acquiring a larger 
share of the world production of differentiated goods generates welfare gains due to savings on trade costs. 
Our work is also related to Corsetti et al. (2007), which considers the role of the home market effect in a real 
trade model, as well as Ghironi and Melitz (2005). We differ from the latter in that we model two tradable 




The text is structured as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 
develops intuition by deriving analytical results for a simplified version of the model. 
Section 4 uses stochastic simulations to demonstrate a broader set of implications. Sections 
5 and 6 delve into extensive sensitivity analysis to explore the core mechanism underlying 
our results, and check their robustness. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. An open economy model with comparative advantage across two tradable sectors 
In what follows, we develop a two-country monetary model, introducing a key 
novel element in the way we specify the goods market structure. Namely, the home and 
foreign countries each produce two types of tradable goods. The first type comes in 
differentiated varieties produced under monopolistic competition.  Firms in this sector face 
a sunk investment cost to enter the market with a new variety, and set prices subject to 
nominal rigidities; moreover, production may require intermediates in a round-about 
production structure. The second type of good is modeled according to the standard 
specification in real business cycle models. For this good, there is perfect substitutability 
among producers within a country (indeed, the good is produced under perfect 
competition), but imperfect substitutability across countries, as summarized by an 
Armington elasticity.  
In the text to follow, we present the households’ and firms’ problems as well as the 
monetary and fiscal policy rules from the vantage point of the home economy, with the 
understanding that similar expressions and considerations apply to the foreign economy—
foreign variables are denoted with a “*”.  
 
2.1. Goods consumption demand and price indexes 
        Households consume goods produced in both sectors, of domestic and foreign origin. 
The differentiated goods come in many varieties, produced by a time-varying number of 
monopolistically competitive firms in the home and foreign country, nt and nt* 
respectively, each producing a single variety.  Each variety is an imperfect substitute for 
any other variety in this sector, either of home or foreign origin, with elasticity ϕ. The non-
differentiated goods come in a home and foreign version, which are imperfect substitutes 
with elasticity η. However, within each country, all goods in this sector are perfectly 
substitutable with each other, and are produced in a perfectly competitive environment.  
We will refer to the differentiated sector as “manufacturing,” and denote this sector with a 
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D; we will denote the non-differentiated sector with a N. 
 The overall consumption index is specified as follows: 
,
 
where   
is the index over the endogenous number of home and foreign varieties of the differentiated 
manufacturing good, ct(h) and ct(f), and  
 
is the index over goods differentiated only by country of origin, and with 
accounting for the weight on domestic goods. For clarity, Figure 1 illustrates the 
aggregation of goods for consumption. The corresponding welfare-based consumption 
price index is  
  , (1) 
where   (2) 
is the index over the prices of all varieties of home and foreign manufacturing goods, pt(h) 
and pt(f), and 
   (3) 
is the index over the prices of home and foreign non-differentiated goods. 
 The relative demand functions for domestic residents implied from our specification 
of preferences are listed below: 
   (4,5) 
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2.2. Home households’ problem  
 The representative home household derives utility from consumption (Ct), and from 
holding real money balances (Mt/Pt); it suffers disutility from labor (lt). The household 
budget consists of labor income from working at the nominal wage rate Wt;  profits rebated 
from home firms denoted with  in real terms and defined below, as well as interest 
income on bonds in home currency (it-1BH,t-1) and foreign currency (it-1*BF,t-1), where et is 
the nominal exchange rate in units of home currency per foreign. Income is net of lump-
sum taxes (Tt). 
 Household optimization for the home country may be written: 
 
where utility is defined by 
, 
subject to the budget constraint:  
. 
In the utility function, the parameter σ denotes risk aversion and ψ is the inverse of the Frisch 
elasticity. The constraint includes a small cost to holding foreign bonds 
, 
scaled by , which is a common device to assure long run stationarity in the net foreign asset 
position, and resolve indeterminacy in the composition of the home bond portfolio. The bond 
adjustment cost is a composite of goods that mirrors the consumption index, with analogous 
demand conditions to equation (4)-(9).3  
 Defining , household optimization implies an intertemporal Euler equation: 
  (10) 
a labor supply condition:
 
 
                                               
3 See the appendix for the full set of demand equations. Note that the different components of aggregate 
demand fall on different baskets of final goods, e.g., intermediate inputs and sunk entry costs only involve 
goods from the differentiated goods sector. Nonetheless, the demand for differentiated goods follows on the 
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  (11) 
a money demand condition: 
 , (12) 
and a home interest rate parity condition: 
 . (13) 
 The problem and first order conditions for the foreign household are analogous. 
 
2.3. Home firm problem and entry condition in the differentiated goods sector 
 In the manufacturing sector, the production of each differentiated variety follows 
 , (14) 
where  is a  productivity shock specific to the production of differentiated goods but 
common to all firms within that sector, lt(h) is the labor employed by firm h, and  is a 
composite of differentiated goods used by firm h as an intermediate input. is specified 
as an index of home and foreign differentiated varieties that mirrors the consumption index 
specific to differentiated goods ( ). If we sum across firms,  represents 
economy-wide demand for differentiated goods as intermediate inputs, and given that the 
index is the same as for consumption, this implies demands for differentiated goods 
varieties analogous to equations (6)–(7). 
   (15, 16) 
 Differentiated goods firms set prices subject to an adjustment cost: 
 , (17) 
where  is a calibrated parameter governing the degree of price stickiness. For the sake 
of tractability, we follow Bilbiie et al. (2008) in assuming that new entrants inherit from 
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the price history of incumbents the same price adjustment cost, and so make the same 
price setting decision.4   
There is free entry in the sector, but, once active, firms are subject to an exogenous 
death shock. Since all differentiated goods producers operating at any given time face the 
same exogenous probability of exit , a fraction  of them exogenously stop operating 
each period.  The number of firms active in the differentiated sector, nt, at the beginning of 
each period evolves according to:  
 , (18) 
where net denotes new entrants.  
To set up a firm, managers incur a one-time sunk cost, Kt, and production starts 
with a one-period lag. This cost is not constant but varies reflecting an entry congestion 
externality, represented as an adjustment cost that is a function of the number of new firms:  
  , (19) 
where  indicates the steady state level of entry cost, and the parameter  indicates how 
much the entry cost rises with an increase in entry activity. The congestion externality 
plays a similar role as the adjustment cost for capital standard in business cycle models, 
which moderates the response of investment to match dynamics in data. In a similar vein, 
we calibrate the adjustment cost parameter, , to match data on the dynamics of new firm 
entry.5 Entry costs are specified either in units of labor (if =1) or in units of the 
differentiated good (if =0).   If entry costs are in units of differentiated goods, the 
investment-driven demand is distributed analogously to demands for consumption of 
differentiated goods:  
   (20) 
  . (21) 
 We now can specify total demand facing a domestic differentiated goods firm: 
   (22) 
                                               
4 The price index for adjustment cost is identical to the overall consumption price index, implying demands 
analogous to those for consumption in equations (4)-(9). See the supplementary online appendix for the full 
list of equations. 
5 The value of steady state entry cost  has no effect on the dynamics of the model, and so will be 
normalized to unity. 
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which includes the demand for consumption ( ) by households, and the demand by 
firms for intermediate inputs ( ), investment (the sunk entry costs) ( ), and 
goods absorbed as adjustment costs for prices ( ) and bonds holding costs 
( ). There is an analogous demand from abroad . We assume iceberg trade 
costs for exports, so that market clearing for a firm’s variety is:  
 , (23) 
Firm profits are computed as: 
 . (24) 
where  is marginal cost. 
Thus the value function of firms that enter the market in period t may be 
represented as the discounted sum of profits of domestic sales and export sales:  
 ,  
where we assume firms use the discount factor of the representative household, who owns 
the firm, to value future profits. With free entry, new producers will invest until the point 
that a firm’s value equals the entry sunk cost: 
   , (25) 
recalling =1 is the case of entry costs in labor units, and  =0 the case of goods units. 
By solving for cost minimization we can express the relative demand for labor and 
intermediates as a function of their relative costs: 
  . (26) 
 Managers optimally set prices by maximizing the firm value subject to all the 
constraints specified above.  The price setting equation: 
  (27) 
expresses the optimal pricing as a function of the stochastically discounted demand faced 
by producers of domestic differentiated goods, 
( )tc h
, ( )G td h , ( )K td h
, , ( )AC P td h
, , ( )AC B td h ( )*td h
Dt
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*1t t D ty h d h d ht= + +
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * ,t t t t t t t t t p th p h d h e p h d h mc y h P AC hp = + - -
( ) 1 1, ,1 /t D t t D tmc P W
zz z zz z a-- -= -




t t t s
s t













































p h p h p h
p h mc p h
p h p h p h
p h p h
E







æ ö æ ö
= + - - -ç ÷ ç ÷
- -è ø è ø
é ùæ öW
+ -ê úç ÷




This sums the demand arising from consumption, use as intermediate inputs, sunk entry 
cost, price adjustment costs, and bond holding costs.  
Under the assumption that firms preset prices in own currency, i.e., assuming producer 
currency pricing, the good price in foreign currency moves one-to-one with the exchange rate, 
net of trade costs:  
 , (28) 
where recall the nominal exchange rate, e, measures home currency units per foreign.   
Note that, since households own firms, they receive firm profits but also finance the 
creation of new firms. In the household budget, the net income from firms may be written: 
. 
In reporting our quantitative results, we will refer to the overall home gross production of 
differentiated goods defined as: . 
 
2.4. Home firm problem in the undifferentiated goods sector 
In the second sector firms are assumed to be perfectly competitive in producing a 
good differentiated only by country of origin. The production function for the home non-
differentiated good is linear in labor:  
 , (29) 
where  is stochastic productivity specific to this country and sector. It follows that the 
price of the homogeneous goods in the home market is equal to marginal costs: 
 . (30) 
An iceberg trade cost specific to the non-differentiated sector implies prices of the home 
good abroad are 
 . (31) 
Analogous conditions apply to the foreign non-differentiated sector. 
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2.5. Monetary policy 
The goal of our analysis is to trace the effects of monetary policy regimes on 
comparative advantage and the composition of production and exports. Consistent with this 
goal, we compute the Ramsey allocation as our optimal policy benchmark. Relative to this 
benchmark, we will study the implications of different types of policies.  
To compute the Ramsey allocation, we posit that the monetary authority maximizes 
aggregate welfare of both countries: 
 
under the constraints of the economy defined above. As common in the literature, we write 
the Ramsey problem by introducing additional co-state variables, which track the value of 
the planner committing to a policy plan.  
 We study an inflation targeting regime by positing a rule that fully stabilizes output 
gaps. In the context of this model, this rule fully stabilizes prices in the differentiated goods 
sector: 
  . (32) 
As will be discussed below, targeting inflation specific to the differentiated goods sector is 
sufficient to replicate the flexible price equilibrium. To study a policy that deviates 
substantially from optimal stabilization, we posit that a country renounces monetary 
independence, and pursues a peg of the nominal exchange rate,  
  . (33) 
Enforcement of this peg may be assigned either to the home or foreign policy maker. 
 For comparing the model to data, we approximate historical policy rules with the 
following Taylor rule: 
  , (34) 
where terms with overbars are steady state values. In this rule, inflation is defined in terms 
of differentiated goods producer prices, while Yt is a measure of GDP defined net of 
intermediates as:6 
                                               
6 For computational simplicity, the Taylor rule is specified in terms of deviations of GDP from its steady 
state value, which is distinct from the output gap. 
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  . 
Across these different specifications of monetary policy, we will abstract from 
public consumption expenditure, so that the government uses seigniorage revenues and 
taxes to finance transfers, assumed to be lump sum. The home government faces the budget 
constraint:  
 . (35) 
 
2.6. Market clearing  
 The market clearing condition for the manufacturing goods market is given in equation 
(22) above.  Market clearing for the non-differentiated goods market requires: 
  (36) 
 . (37) 
Labor market clearing requires: 
 . (38) 
Bond market clearing requires: 
  (39) 
  (40) 
Balance of payments requires: 
 (41) 
 
2.7. Shocks process and equilibrium definition  
 We will consider a number of shocks studied in the literature, featuring shocks to 
productivity, but also including shocks to intertemporal consumption preferences, money 
demand, and fiscal policy. Given the structure of our economy, shocks are assumed to 
follow joint log normal distributions. In the case of productivity, for instance, we can 
write: 
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with autoregressive coefficient matrix , and the covariance matrix .   
A competitive equilibrium in our world economy is defined along the usual lines, 
as a set of processes for quantities and prices in the home and foreign country satisfying: 
(i) the household and firms optimality conditions; (ii) the market clearing conditions for 
each good and asset, including money; (iii) the resource constraints—whose specification 
can be easily derived from the above and is omitted to save space. 
 
2.8. Relative price and export share measures 
Along with the real exchange rate ( ), we report two alternative measures of 
international prices. First, as is common practice in the production of statistics on 
international relative prices, we compute the terms of trade weighting goods with their 
respective expenditure shares: 
 , (42) 
where the weight  measures the share of differentiated goods in the home country’s overall 
exports: 
 , (43) 
and measures the counterpart for the foreign country:
 . (44) 
Following the trade literature, we also compute the terms of trade as the ratio of ex-factory 
prices set by home firms relative to foreign firms in the manufacturing sector: 
.7  The latter measure ignores the non-differentiated goods sector.  
  
  
                                               
7 This is the same definition used in Ossa (2011).  See also Helpman and Krugman (1989), and Campolmi 
et al. (2014). 
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3. Analytical insights from a simplified version of the model 
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of the mechanism by which monetary 
policy impinges on pricing by differentiated goods manufactures, ultimately determining 
the country’s comparative advantage in the sector. To be as clear as possible, we work out 
a simplified version of the model that is amenable to analytical results. Despite a number of 
assumptions needed to make the model tractable, the key predictions of the simplified 
model will be confirmed in the full-fledged version of the model. 
 We specialize our model as follows. First, we posit that production of differentiated 
goods involves only labor with no intermediates ( = 0) and that entry costs are in labor 
units ( = 1). Second, we consider the case where these differentiated goods firms operate 
for one period only (implying  in the entry condition), and symmetrically preset prices 
over the same horizon. Third, we simplify the non-differentiated good by setting its trade 
costs to zero ( ) and let the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 
approach infinity ( ). This implies that the sector produces a homogeneous good, an 
assumption frequently made in the trade literature.8 Fourth, we restrict productivity shocks 
to be i.i.d., and only occur in the differentiated goods sector (we abstract from productivity 
shocks in the non-differentiated goods sector). Fifth, utility is log in consumption and linear 
in leisure ( ). Finally, we abstract from international asset trade ( ). This 
simplification has no effect on our results, as we show below that under trade in a single 
homogenous good whose production is not subject to shocks, production risk is efficiently 
shared between countries, even in the absence of trade in financial assets, and 
independently of the way production and trade are specified in the other sector. Drawing on 
the NOEM literature (see Corsetti and Pesenti 2005, and Bergin and Corsetti 2008), we 
carry out our analysis of stabilization policy by identifying a country’s monetary stance 
with , under the control of monetary authorities via their ability to set the interest 
rate. Following this approach, we therefore study monetary policy in terms of  (and  
for the foreign country). 
 In the simplified version of our model, the firms’ problem becomes 
, 
                                               
8 Different from the trade literature, however, we do treat this sector as an integral part of the equilibrium 
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where we have used the fact that the discount rate for nominal quantities coincides with the 
(inverse of the) growth rate of . The optimal preset price in the domestic market is: 
 , (45) 
where  is the firm’s marginal costs, that is, the ratio of nominal wages 
to labor productivity, and  is the stochastically discounted value of future demand 
facing the firm for its good in both the domestic and the foreign markets: 
.9 
The home entry condition is a function of price setting and the exchange rate: 
 . (46) 
 Provided that the price setting rules can be expressed as functions of the exogenous 
shocks and the monetary stance, the home and foreign equilibrium entry conditions along 
with the exchange rate solution above comprise a three equation system in the three 
variables: e, n and n*. This system admits analytical solutions for several configurations of 
the policy rules. 
A notable property of the simplified version of the model is that the exchange rate is 
a function of the ratio of nominal consumption demands, hence of the monetary policy 
stances. To see this, recall that both economies produce the same homogeneous good with 
identical technology under perfect competition, and this good is traded costlessly across 
borders, hence arbitrage ensures that . The exchange rate then can be expressed 
as: 
 , (47) 
where we have used the labor supply condition (11) imposing linear preferences in leisure 
( ). Given symmetric technology in labor input only, the law of one price implies that 
nominal wages are equalized (once expressed in a common currency) across the border.10   
                                               
9 Upon appropriate substitutions,  in equation (45) may also be written as follows
. 
10 In our simplified version of the model, nominal wage equalization is due to trade in a single homogenous 
good whose production is not subject to shocks. A remarkable implication is that production risk is efficiently 
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3.1. Nominal rigidities and the equilibrium allocation  
 At the core of our results is a general property of sticky price models that is best 
exemplified in our simplified model. Rewrite (45) as follows: 
                        
                        (48) 
By the covariance term on the right-hand side of this expression, the optimal preset price is 
a function of the comovements of a firm’s marginal costs ( ), and overall 
(domestic and foreign) demand for the firm’s good, . To appreciate the relevance of 
this property for monetary policy, consider the extreme case of no monetary stabilization of 
business cycle fluctuation, i.e., posit that the monetary stance does not respond to any 
shock, but target a constant nominal demand in either country ( ). When the two 
countries pursue such a rule symmetrically, the nominal exchange rate remains constant at 
 and, with i.i.d. shocks, there is no dynamics in predetermined variables such 
as prices and numbers of firms. Under the above rules, the optimal preset prices (48) 
simplify to  
  , 
that is, prices are equal to the expected marginal costs (coinciding with the inverse of 
productivity) augmented by the equilibrium markup. Note that these optimal pricing 
decisions no longer depend on the term Ω’ (hence do not vary with trade costs and firms 
entry), as they do in the general case. The number of firms can be computed by substituting 
these prices into the entry condition (46), so to obtain: 
                                               
shared, even in the absence of trade in financial assets, and independently of the way production and trade are 
specified in the other sector. To see this, just rewrite equation (47)  as the standard perfect risk sharing 
condition: 
 
Home consumption rises relative to foreign consumption only in those states of the world in which its 
relative price (i.e. the real exchange rate) is weak. 
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 Intuitively, given constant monetary stances, there is no change in the exchange 
rate. With preset prices, a shock to productivity will have no effect on the terms of trade 
nor the real exchange rate, hence there will be no change in consumption demands and 
production for either type of good. With no monetary response, an i.i.d. shock raising 
productivity in the home manufacturing sector necessarily leads to a fall in the level of 
employment in the same sector (not compensated by a change in employment in the other 
sectors of the economy). Firms end up producing at low marginal costs and thus sub-
optimally high markups, since nominal rigidities prevent firms from re-pricing and scaling 
down production. Conversely, given nominal prices and demand, a drop in productivity 
will cause firms to produce too much at high marginal costs, hence at sub-optimally low 
markups. So, in a regime of no output gap stabilization, firms face random realizations of 
inefficiently high and inefficiently low levels of production and markup. When presetting 
prices, managers maximize the value of their firm by trading off higher markups in the low 
productivity state, with lower markups in the high productivity states. In our model above, 
they weigh more of the risk of producing too much at high marginal costs: it is easy to see 
that preset prices are increasing in the variance of productivity shocks (by Jensen’s 
inequality, ).11  
Since both marginal costs and overall demand are functions of monetary stances, in 
the general case policy regimes can critically impinge on pricing (and thus on entry) via the 
covariance term in the equation. The implications for our argument are detailed next. 
 
3.2. Prices and firm dynamics under efficient and inefficient stabilization 
 Suppose that the monetary stance in each country moves in proportion to 
productivity in the differentiated goods sector: . The exchange rate in this 
case is not constant, but contingent on productivity differentials, so that the home currency 
systematically depreciates in response to an asymmetric rise in home productivity: 
                                               
11 As discussed in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) in a closed economy context, 
given nominal demand, high preset prices allow firms to contain overproduction when low productivity 
squeezes markups, rebalancing demand across states of nature. High average markups, in turn, exacerbate 
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It is easy to see that, by ensuring that the nominal marginal costs  remain constant, 
the above policy zeroes the covariance term in (48), and thus insulates the ex-post 
markup charged by home manufacturing firms from uncertainty about productivity.12 
Note that, to the extent that monetary policy stabilizes marginal costs completely, it also 
stabilizes markups at their flex-price equilibrium level. It follows that the price firms 
preset is lower than in an economy with no stabilization:  
. 
In a multi-sector context, a key effect of monetary stabilization is that of reducing a 
country’s differentiated goods’ price in terms of domestic non-differentiated goods, 
redirecting demand across sectors. This rise in demand for differentiated goods supports 
the entry of additional manufacturing firms. 
Since the model posits that the homogenous good sector operates under perfect 
competition and flexible prices, there is no trade-off in stabilizing output across different 
sectors. It is therefore possible to replicate the flex-price allocation under a monetary 
policy rule that stabilizes markups in the differentiated sector. As shown in the appendix, 
under this rule the number of manufacturing firms is:13 
 
the same as under flexible prices.14 
                                               
12 To wit: in response to an incipient fall in domestic marginal costs domestic demand and a real 
depreciation boost foreign demand for domestic product. As nominal wages rise with aggregate demand, 
marginal costs are completely stabilized at a higher level of production. Vice versa, by curbing domestic 
demand and appreciating the currency when marginal costs are rising, monetary policy can prevent 
overheating, driving down demand and nominal wages. Again, marginal costs are completely stabilized as 
a result. 
13 Symmetric stabilization policies may or may not raise the number of firms compared to the no 
stabilization case; it is impossible to derive a clear-cut analytical result (see the appendix). Model 
simulations suggest that there is no difference for log utility, and a small positive different for CES utility 
with a higher elasticity of substitution. Nonetheless, we are able to provide below an analytical 
demonstration of asymmetric stabilization, which is our main objective.  
14 The above generalizes to our setup a familiar result of the classical NOEM literature (without entry) 
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Contrast this allocation with the case in which, while the home government keeps 
stabilizing its output gap, the foreign country switches monetary regime to a currency peg:   
.15 
Under the policy scenario just described, the optimally preset prices of domestically and 
foreign produced differentiated goods are, respectively:  
,       . 
While the home policy makers manage to stabilize the markup of manufacturing firms 
completely, the foreign firms producing under the peg regime face stochastic marginal 
costs/markups driven by shocks to productivity wherever they occur, either in the 
domestic economy or abroad. With i.i.d. shocks, preset prices will be increasing in the 
term Et(1/α*t+1), as in the no stabilization case. 
While it is not possible to solve for the number of firms in closed form, as shown in 
the appendix it is possible to prove that 
nt > ntstab > nt*. 
Other things equal, the constraint on macroeconomic stabilization implied by a currency 
peg tends to reduce the size of the manufacturing sector in the foreign country: there are 
fewer firms, each charging a higher price. The home country’s manufacturing sector 
correspondingly expands.  In other words, the country pegging its currency tends to 
specialize in the homogeneous good sector.   
To fix ideas: insofar as the foreign peg results in higher relative prices in the foreign 
manufacturing sector, inefficient stabilization redirects demand towards the (now relatively 
cheaper) non-differentiated goods sector. Most crucially, as the ratio of the country’s 
differentiated goods prices to non-differentiated goods prices rises compared to the home 
country, the foreign comparative advantage in the sector weakens: domestic demand shifts 
towards differentiated imports from the home country. Because of higher monopolistic 
distortions and the higher trade costs in imports of differentiated goods, foreign 
consumption falls overall (in line with the predictions from the closed economy one-sector 
counterpart of our model, e.g., Bergin and Corsetti 2008). All these effects combined 
                                               
Devereux and Engel (2003), among others): despite nominal rigidities, policymakers are able to stabilize the 
output gap relative to the natural-rate, flex-price allocation. 
15 A related exercise consists of assuming that the foreign country keeps its money growth constant 
( ) while home carries out its stabilization policy as above. 
* and 1,  so that t t t t t teµ a µ µ a= = = =




















reduce the incentive for foreign firms to enter in the differentiated goods sector. The 
country’s loss of competitiveness is mirrored by a trend appreciation of its welfare-relevant 
real exchange rate, mainly due to the fall in varieties available to the consumers. 
Remarkably, real appreciation is actually associated with weaker, not stronger, terms of 
trade. Weaker terms of trade follow from the change in the composition of foreign 
production and exports, with more weight attached to low value added non-differentiated 
goods.  
The consequences of a foreign peg on the home economy are specular. The home 
country experiences a surge of world demand for its differentiated goods production, while 
stronger terms of trade boost domestic consumption. More firms enter the manufacturing 
sector, leading to a shift in the composition of its production and exports in favor of this 
sector. As a result, with a foreign country passively pegging its currency, there are extra 
benefits for the home country from being able to pursue stabilization policies. The home 
manufacturing sector expands driven by higher home demand overall, and fills part of the 
gap in manufacturing production no longer supplied by foreign firms. At the same time, the 
shifting pattern of specialization ensures that the home demand for the homogeneous good 
is satisfied via additional imports from the foreign country. 
 
4. Results from the benchmark specification of the full model 
 In this and the next sections, we evaluate the quantitative implications of our full 
model. Despite the many differences, we will show that the key results from the simplified 
versions of our model continue to hold in the full version. Namely, in our general 
specification it will still be true that, if the foreign country moves from efficient 
stabilization to a peg, while the home country sticks to efficient stabilization rules, (a) the 
foreign average markups and prices in manufacturing will tend to increase and (b) there 
will be production relocation—firm entry in the foreign country will fall on average, while 
entry in the home country will rise on average. Correspondingly, average consumption will 
rise at home relative to foreign. We will also show that this relocation will be associated 
with an average improvement in the home terms of trade (while the home welfare-relevant 
real exchange rate depreciates). Quantitatively, we will show that these effects are far from 
negligible, and that they have significant welfare implications.  
  The model is solved as a second order approximation around a deterministic steady 
state. In our simulations, nominal variables are scaled by the consumer price index, Pt, to 
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allow for the possibility of a steady state inflation rate that is not zero in the Ramsey policy 
solution. Throughout our analysis we will assess the model predictions under four 
monetary policy regimes: cooperative Ramsey, inflation targeting, asymmetric currency 
peg and, for the purpose of comparison with data, a Taylor rule approximating historical 
behavior. 
  In the remainder of this section, we start with a discussion of our calibration and 
discuss results under our benchmark parameterization. We will analyze, in turn, impulse 
responses, unconditional means and welfare. 
 
4.1. Model Calibration 
Where possible, parameter values are taken from standard values in the literature. 
Risk aversion is set at ; labor supply elasticity is set at  following Hall 
(2009). Parameter values are chosen to be consistent with an annual frequency—the 
frequency at which sectoral productivity data are available. Accordingly, time preference 
is set at .  
To choose parameters for the differentiated and non-differentiated sectors we draw 
on Rauch (1999). We choose  so that differentiated goods represent 55 percent of U.S. 
trade in value. We assume the two countries are of equal size with no exogenous home 
bias, , but allow trade costs to determine home bias ratios. To set the elasticities of 
substitution for the differentiated and non-differentiated goods we draw on the estimates by 
Broda and Weinstein (2006), classified by sectors based on Rauch (1999). The Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) estimate of the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods 
varieties is =5.2 (the sample period is 1972-1988). The corresponding elasticity of 
substitution for non-differentiated commodities is = 15.3. 
The price stickiness parameter is set at , a value which in a Calvo setting 
would correspond to half the firms resetting price on impact of a shock, with 75 percent 
resetting their price after one year.16  The firm death rate is set at , which is four 
                                               
16 As is well understood, a log-linearized Calvo price-setting model implies a stochastic difference equation 
for inflation of the form , where mc is the firm’s real marginal cost of production, and  
where , with q is the constant probability that a firm must keep its price unchanged in 
any given period. The Rotemberg adjustment cost model used here gives a similar log-linearized difference 
equation for inflation, but with . Under our parameterization, a Calvo probability of q = 0.5 
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times the standard rate of 0.025 to reflect the annual frequency. The mean sunk cost of 
entry is normalized to the value =1. The share of intermediates in differentiated goods 
production is set to a modest value of  =1/3, though higher values will be considered in 
robustness checks.17 
 To set trade costs, we calibrate so that exports represent 26% of GDP, as is the 
average in World Bank national accounts data for OECD countries from 2000-2017.18 This 
requires a value of =0.33.19 This is similar to the value of trade costs typically assumed by 
macro research, such as 0.25 in Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001.  But it is small compared to some 
trade estimates, such as 1.7 suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop 2004, and adopted by 
Epifani and Gancia (2017). As shown later on, sensitivity analysis to a wide range of values for 
the trade cost suggests that our results are robust to calibrations implying trade shares both 
much higher and much lower than in our benchmark calibration. We begin with the standard 
assumption of trade models that the homogeneous good is traded frictionlessly ( ), but we 
will consider a range of values for this parameter also in sensitivity analysis.  
 The benchmark simulation model specifies entry costs in units of goods ( =0) but 
we will also report results for entry costs in labor units in our sensitivity analysis (see the 
discussion in Cavallari, 2013). The adjustment cost parameter for new firm entry, , is 
chosen to match the standard deviation of new firm entry in the benchmark simulation to 
that in data. Data for the U.S. on establishment entry are available from the Longitudinal 
Business Database. The standard deviation for this series, logged and HP-filtered, taken as 
a ratio to the standard deviation of GDP for 2004-2012, is 5.53. A value of = 0.10 in the 
simulation model, with the remaining parameters and shocks as described above, generates 
standard deviations of new firm entry close to this value. (See Table 2b.) 
To our knowledge, no one else has calibrated a DSGE model with sectoral shocks 
distinct to differentiated and non-differentiated goods. Annual time series of sectoral 
                                               
implies an adjustment cost parameter of  = 8.7. This computation is confirmed by a stochastic 
simulation of a permanent shock raising home differentiated goods productivity without international 
spillovers, which implies that price adjusts 50% of the way to its long run value immediately on impact of 
the shock, and 75% at one period (year in our case) after the shock.  
17 There is a wide range of views regarding the appropriate calibration for this parameter. Jones (2007) 
suggests a value of 0.43 for the share of intermediates, and it is common in the related literature to use a 
value at 1/2. We will consider a range of values for this parameter in sensitivity analysis, but we use a 
modest value of this parameter for our benchmark model. 
18 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=OE. 
19 To coincide with standard accounting definitions, differentiated goods used as intermediates are included 












productivities are available from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC), 
for the period 1980-2007. Given that we wish to isolate the asymmetries across countries 
that can be specifically attributed to asymmetric monetary policies, we choose to 
parameterize the two countries in the model symmetrically in all respects but the policy 
rules. So we use data for the U.S. to parameterize sectoral shocks in both the home and the 
foreign economy.20 Using U.S. series, sectoral TFP is calculated on a value-added basis.  
The differentiated goods sector comprises total manufacturing excluding wood, chemical, 
minerals, and basic metals; the non-differentiated goods sector comprises agriculture, 
mining, and subcategories of manufacturing excluded from the differentiated sector. To 
calculate the weight of each subsector within the differentiated (or non-differentiated) 
sector, we use the 1995 gross value added (at current prices) of each subsector divided by 
the total value added for the differentiated (or non-differentiated) sector. After taking logs 
of the weighted series, we de-trend each series using the HP filter. Parameters 𝜌 and Ω, 
reported in Table 1, are obtained from running a VAR(1) on the two de-trended series. In 
the benchmark case, we assume no international correlation of shocks—as to clarify the 
way shocks transmit across borders. We will nonetheless present simulations allowing for 
the correlation detected in the data in our robustness analysis. 
 Calibration of policy parameters for the historical monetary policy Taylor rule are 
taken from Coenen, et al. (2008): =0.7, =1.7, =0.1. 
 As shown in Table 2, under our benchmark calibration, the model is broadly in line 
with the volatility of U.S. output, as well as the volatilities of key variables (in ratio to the 
volatility of output), such as consumption, employment and net business formation.21 22  
The moments reported in the table are generated by a stochastic simulation of the model 
under a Taylor policy rule specified with historical policy parameters, as discussed above. 
                                               
20 We note that Backus et al., 1992 similarly used a “symmetricized” parameterization of the shock process 
as their benchmark case for quantitative experiments in their two-country model.  
21 The standard deviation of the home nominal interest rate under the historical policy rule is 0.0039 in units 
of percentage points (where the mean level of the interest rate is 0.0417 percentage points).  Under symmetric 
inflation targeting this standard deviation rises to 0.0106, under foreign peg/home inflation targeting it is 
0.0069, and Ramsey policy implies a value of 0.0151. 
22 Simulations are conducted for a first order approximation of the model, with results HP filtered with 




Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), to facilitate comparison with data, Table 2 reports 
model simulations with units deflated using a data-consistent price index.23  
 
4.2. Impulse responses 
We start our study of how monetary policy can impinge on comparative advantage 
by analyzing the dynamic transmission of shocks under alternative monetary regimes.  For 
our benchmark calibration, Figure 2 reports impulse response analysis. The figure shows 
the response of key variables to a one standard deviation positive shock to productivity in 
the differentiated goods sector of the home country. The figure reports results under three 
regimes: Ramsey optimal cooperative policies (solid line), independent inflation targeting 
(dashed line), and unilateral peg (dotted line). 
Let’s focus first on the case of independent inflation targeting (dashed line). The 
home policy responds to a positive productivity shock with a monetary expansion that 
lowers the home interest rate. This boosts domestic demand and depreciates home 
currency, shifting demand from foreign differentiated goods toward their home 
counterparts. Per effect of this policy reaction, production in the differentiated sector at 
home rises in line with its enhanced productivity—so far these results are in line with the 
literature specifying only one tradable good. Here is where our model differs: the number 
of home firms in the sector rises, and domestic production of tradables shifts in favor of 
home differentiated goods, away from non-differentiated goods. The response of the 
composition of production and exports is the opposite in the foreign country.  While 
foreign production of differentiated goods falls, along with a fall in the number of foreign 
differentiated goods firms, non-differentiated production actually rises. The productivity 
shock affects the comparative advantage of the home country, which monetary policy 
accommodates by favoring the adjustment in relative prices across goods and borders. 
The allocation under the inflation targeting regime is a key benchmark for our 
analysis since, as explained above, it supports the same allocation as under flexible prices.24 
Policies that replicate the flexible price allocation, however, are not necessarily optimal. In 
                                               
23 For any variable  in consumption units, we report data-consistent units as , where  is 
an overall price index that uses a price sub-index of differentiated goods redefined as . 
24 Numerical experiments not shown confirm that this inflation targeting regime exactly replicates the 
dynamics of real variables in a flexible-price equilibrium of this model (where the price setting cost, , is 
set to zero and money growth is held constant), preserving a constant markup for all the productivity shocks. 








our model, there are a number of distortions, in addition to sticky prices, including 
incomplete asset markets (leading to imperfect international risk sharing), and monopolistic 
markups that distort the relative price between differentiated goods on one hand, and non-
differentiated goods and leisure on the other. Further, product creation is distortionary, 
because markups are disconnected from the benefit of productivity to consumers. 
The allocation under the optimal policy is derived from the Ramsey solution, as 
defined above. As shown by the solid lines in Figure 2, in the context of our model the 
impulse responses under Ramsey are very similar to those under inflation targeting. The 
fall in the home interest rate in response to the shock is almost identical—the home 
currency depreciation is slightly smaller under Ramsey.  As for the inflation targeting case, 
the Ramsey policy facilitates a shift in home production toward differentiated goods and 
away from non-differentiated goods, and enhances the entry of home firms into the 
differentiated goods sector. Again, the foreign country variables move in the opposite 
direction. Overall, the Ramsey policy implies nearly perfect stabilization of inflation in the 
differentiated goods sector, with a standard deviation of just 0.2%, corresponding to a 
standard deviation of overall inflation (including imported inflation) of 1.7%. It also 
implies zero steady state inflation in differentiated goods prices. 
This is quite different from the case in which one country commits to an exchange 
rate peg. To facilitate the comparison, we posit that the peg is pursued by the home 
country, and focus on the impulse responses after the home country shock (the dotted lines 
in Figure 2). The foreign country keeps operating under an inflation targeting regime.  The 
impulse responses deviate sharply from the other two cases, especially in the initial periods 
after the shock, when the adjustment in prices is still small because of nominal rigidities.  
The home interest rate barely changes (as it does so only in response to policy decisions 
abroad), so that there is no significant stimulus of domestic demand. As a result, on impact, 
the home differentiated goods production rises only by a third relative to inflation targeting. 
The change in the number of firms, as well as in production in the non-differentiated sector 
is also much smaller. Clearly the commitment to a peg severely limits the ability of the 






4.3. Beyond the short run: an analysis of unconditional means of macroeconomic 
variables 
 The differences in the transmission of shocks under different policy regimes 
translate into differences in production, consumption and trade also in the medium to the 
long run. To show this, we report in Table 3 the unconditional means of key variables 
obtained from a second order approximation of the benchmark model.25 The first column 
reports means under Ramsey optimal policy, while the other four columns report the 
percentage difference in means relative to the Ramsey solution implied by alternative 
monetary policy regimes. The main contribution is in column (5), corresponding to the case 
in which the foreign country adopts an exchange rate peg, while the home country targets 
inflation.  
A first important result from our numerical exercises is that the full model confirms 
the main insights from the simplified model in the preceding section. When the foreign 
country pegs its currency while the home country fully stabilizes inflation (column 5), the 
mean level of production of the differentiated good falls in the foreign country and rises in 
the home country; the foreign country instead has a higher mean level of production of the 
non-differentiated good. Relative to the Ramsey allocation, the share of differentiated 
goods in foreign exports ( ) is 4.6 percentage points lower, while the corresponding share 
at home ( ) is 3.9 percentage points higher. This production relocation is facilitated by a 
drop, by 6.8 percent, in the number of foreign firms producing differentiated goods, and a 
rise, by 8.3 percent, of differentiated goods firms at home. 
Also consistent with the key insight from the analytical model is the mechanism 
initiating the production relocation: this is a shift in comparative advantage corresponding 
to the equilibrium adjustment in relative prices across sectors and countries. On the one 
hand, when the foreign country adopts a peg, home wages rise compared to foreign, driving 
up all prices in the economy—including the price of home differentiated goods. Indeed, 
compared to foreign, this price rises slightly, even after accounting for the home currency 
depreciation: see in Table 3. On the other hand, what matters for 
comparative advantage is not the absolute level of prices, but the relative price of 
differentiated to non-differentiated goods. In the table, this relative price falls at home (0.28 
percent) while rising in foreign (0.72 percent). In part the price adjustment stems from a 
                                               
25 Unconditional means are analytical, with no HP filtering applied. 
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higher markup (by 0.10 percent) charged on average by foreign firms in the differentiated 
goods sector, reflecting the risk-premium-like term in the price-setting equation discussed 
in the previous section. In the full model used in our simulations, however, markup 
adjustment is compounded by a higher cost of intermediate inputs, given that foreign firms 
pay trade cost on the now higher imports of intermediates: the differentiated goods 
composite price index rises 0.73 percent abroad and only 0.07 at home.  Combined, the rise 
in markups and the rise in marginal costs in the production of differentiated goods in 
foreign tilt the comparative advantage for producing and exporting these goods toward the 
home country.  
Notably, because of the logic of comparative advantage, price competitiveness 
gains in the differentiated goods sector need not be in contradiction to an improvement in a 
country’s terms of trade—as predicted by the standard monetary model. As shown in Table 
3, while the home country acquires an advantage in producing differentiated goods, its 
overall terms of trade (defined over the full range of goods including both differentiated 
and non-differentiated TOTS), improve dramatically. Note that this is so, in spite of the fact 
that home firms charge a lower markup on differentiated goods relative to foreign firms.   
This improvement in overall terms of trade, TOTS, can partly be attributed to the 
rise in wages noted above. The behavior of wages highlights a qualitative difference 
between the full version of the model and the simplified version solved analytically in the 
previous section – when the labor supply is not infinitely elastic, a high level of entry tends 
to raise demand for labor and hence wages and production costs. Depending on the labor 
supply elasticity, the rise in production costs may be strong enough to prevent the 
international price of domestic manufacturing from falling in tandem with average markup 
in the differentiated goods sector—so to cause the small rise in the manufacturing terms of 
trade, TOTM, observed in Table 3.  
The TOTS improvement is nonetheless much larger, pointing to a second and 
crucial effect at work, the change in the composition of exports. As foreign exports shift 
away from differentiated goods, the weight of these, more expensive, goods is smaller in 
the price index of foreign exports, but larger in the price index of foreign imports. The 
relevance of this result for the open macro literature should not be missed, as it reconciles a 
key prediction of recent monetary models, concerning the policy objective of stronger 
terms of trade, with policy debates typically focused on the role of monetary policy to 
foster price competitiveness. 
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In Table 3, the second and third columns show the means implied by, respectively, 
the historical Taylor rule (used previously to generate standard deviations in Table 1), and a 
symmetric policy of full stabilization of producer price inflation in the differentiated goods 
sector. In both cases, there is a small drop in production of differentiated goods relative to 
the Ramsey solution. In the fourth column the foreign peg is paired with the historical 
Taylor rule at home. The effects of the peg are similar to the benchmark case (column 5), 
but magnitudes are smaller—e.g., the number of home firms in the differentiated goods 
sector rises only by 1.2%, compared to  8.3% when home pursues inflation targeting. 
 
4.4. Welfare analysis 
We conclude this section by discussing welfare implications. In the last three rows 
of Table 3, we report the effects on welfare of each alternative policy regime configuration 
relative to the Ramsey allocation.  The change in welfare customarily is computed in terms 
of consumption units that households would be willing to forgo to continue under the 
Ramsey policy regime; that is, we compute  solving the following:   
. 
We posit identical initial conditions across different monetary policy regimes using the 
Ramsey allocation, and we include transition dynamics in the computation to avoid 
spurious welfare reversals.26 
From the table, it is apparent that the welfare consequences of adopting a peg, and 
hence suffering a shift in comparative advantage towards non-differentiated goods, are 
substantial.  To wit, relative to the Ramsey rule, a foreign peg when the home country 
targets inflation results in a loss of welfare in foreign as high as 1.8%, while the home 
country actually gains a striking 1.4% of consumption equivalent. The two opposing effects 
do not compensate each other at a global level: using equal welfare weights across 
countries, this asymmetric policy is worse than Ramsey by 0.20%. Table 3 indicates that 
this rise in home welfare is associated with large and favorable changes in the mean levels 
of variables in the utility function: the mean level of home consumption rises by 0.83% 
relative to the Ramsey case, and the mean level of home labor falls by 0.84% (with effects 
                                               
























in the opposite direction and similar magnitudes in the pegging country).27 The latter result 
is remarkable, given that more entry in the home country requires more labor, running 
counter to the effects of stronger terms of trade. 
From an aggregate perspective, the welfare implications of a peg are not far from 
the implications of adopting suboptimal symmetric targeting rules. Adopting a symmetric 
inflation target in both countries results in a modest loss of welfare, equal to 0.04%. 
Instead, welfare is marginally worse when both countries adopt (suboptimal) historical 
rules, with losses as high as 0.25%. Yet, from an individual country perspective, the effects 
of an asymmetric peg are more than an order of magnitude larger.28 The shift in 
comparative advantage in differentiated goods in favor of the home country is strongly 
redistributive: welfare forgone in foreign is to a large extent captured by home.  
Table 3 also reports results if, while foreign pegs, home monetary authorities follow 
an historical policy rule. As above, home gains at the expense of foreign. But, given that 
the production relocation effects of historical rules are smaller, the welfare effects are less 
dramatic. 
 
5. Inspecting the mechanism 
In this and in the next section, we carry out extensive sensitivity analysis and 
experiment with different model specifications and parameterizations. The experiments 
discussed in this section are selected with a specific goal: that of highlighting which 
features of the model economy enable monetary policy to have non-negligible effects on 
comparative advantage. Towards this goal, we shut down different elements of our model 
one by one. First, we abstract from endogenous firm dynamics; second, we assume that all 
tradable goods are produced in one sector instead of two; third, we keep a two-sector 
specification, but assume that one of them produces nontradables; fourth we change the 
specification of entry costs; lastly, we shut down trade in assets. In short, the analysis to 
follow will demonstrate that, at different levels, all these elements lie at the core of our 
                                               
27 We note that changes in business cycle fluctuations do not contribute to the asymmetric improvement in 
home welfare. While home welfare is higher, the standard deviation of home consumption and labor both 
are higher when the foreign country pegs, compared to the Ramsey solution. Specifically, the standard 
deviation of home consumption rises from 2.86% to 4.25%, and that for home labor rises from 3.79% to 
5.38%. 
28 An improvement in home welfare relative to the Ramsey solution does not violate the principle of 
Ramsey optimality, as the overall world welfare under this asymmetric policy is still worse than Ramsey. 
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results, but especially the ability of the model to capture endogenous shifts in comparative 
advantage between two exportable goods.  
For all the model specifications listed above, Table 4 reports the effect of a foreign 
peg on welfare and on the shares of differentiated goods exports in each country, as 
percentage changes relative to the Ramsey case. Column (2) refers to the case in which the 
number of firms is exogenous to policy. To do this, we suspend the free entry condition 
(equation 25) at home and in foreign, replacing it with the equations n= n* = 0.41. This 
specification shuts down the production relocation externality in response to differing 
monetary policies. As a result, the substantial asymmetries in welfare arising from the 
foreign peg under endogenous entry virtually disappear.  Both home and foreign countries 
have lower welfare compared to the Ramsey case, by similar amounts. This experiment 
makes it clear, upfront, that an endogenous comparative advantage mechanism, such as the 
one we introduce in our benchmark model, is an essential building block of the mechanism 
generating substantial asymmetric welfare found above.  
  To dig deeper on this point, consider the limit case of a one sector model, where 
non-differentiated goods are eliminated from the model by setting  to a value close to 1. 
The model then approximates a standard sticky price model with firm entry (as in Bergin 
and Corsetti, 2008). The experiment is shown in column (3) of Table 3. Endogenous entry 
still confers the country that stabilize efficiently some advantage: the home country has 
higher welfare than under the Ramsey case. But the difference in welfare is an order of 
magnitude smaller than in the benchmark model with non-differentiated goods. Clearly the 
presence of two distinct tradable sectors is a necessary condition for shifts in comparative 
advantage to amplify the effect of monetary policy. 
In column (4) the model features two sectors, but non-differentiated goods are not 
traded internationally ( ). This specification approximates the standard open economy 
model with traded and non-traded goods. Also in this case, the only margin through which 
monetary policy affects comparative advantage is firm dynamics. The effects from the 
production relocation driving our result are much muted, as they do depend upon shifts in 
comparative advantage between two traded sectors.  
In the fifth column of the table, entry costs are in units of labor rather than in units 
of goods ( ): the home welfare continues to benefit from the foreign peg, but the 
magnitude of the home welfare gain is, once again, much smaller. When entry costs are in 






production relocation mechanism. As home specializes in differentiated goods, a lower 
price index of differentiated goods reduces the entry cost for home firms. This encourages 
yet more home entry into the differentiated goods sector, yet greater specialization in this 
sector, and even lower prices. 
Two features of the economy which conclusions are not sensitive to, are as follows. 
Column (6) suggests that results are not sensitive to the asset market specification, 
inasmuch as an assumption of financial autarky (hence balanced trade) delivers results 
similar to the benchmark case. This case is generated by calibrating the international bond 
holding cost to be prohibitively high.  In fact, the magnitude of the welfare effect is even 
somewhat greater in this case.  
By the same token, Column (7) shows that our results remain close to the benchmark 
specification when prices are assumed sticky in the local currency of the buyer rather than 
seller (to save space, equations for this model specification are presented in the appendix).   
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we complete our sensitivity analysis allowing for a wide range of 
calibrations for key parameters and shocks. We specifically focus on trade costs and the 
structure of production in a first subsection, and a variety of sources of business cycles in a 
second subsection. 
 
6.1 Trade costs and the structure of production 
Figure 3a shows the trade cost of differentiated goods, , has a nonmonotonic 
relationship to the home welfare gain from a foreign peg: welfare gains are low both for 
trade costs near zero and for trade costs near unity, but rise for intermediate values, 
reaching a peak at around =0.3.  To see why, in Figure 3b we show that there is a nearly 
identical hump-shaped relationship between trade costs and the degree of home 
specialization in differentiated goods, measured by the ratio of the number of differentiated 
goods firms at home and in foreign. The figure also plots, separately, the number of firms 
in each country, showing that a higher trade cost on differentiated goods reduces the total 
number of firms active in this sector. Observe that a foreign peg induces more firm entry at 
home than foreign at all levels of trade cost. But the difference between countries is small 
at both extremes of trade costs, and there is a pronounced peak around the same level of 





Figure 3 offers two lessons. First, it provides clear evidence that substantial home 
welfare gains from a foreign peg are driven by the production relocation mechanism at the 
core of our analysis. Ultimately, higher home welfare comes from the fact that home 
consumers pay trade costs on a smaller share of differentiated goods imports:  lower prices 
(index) translate into higher consumption. This result crucially hinges on the home country 
endogenously specializing in the production of differentiated goods.  
 Second, Figure 3b highlights the reason why the relationship between trade cost 
and welfare is non-monotonic, stressing the interplay of trade costs with the production 
relocation effect. At one extreme, high trade costs restrict the scope for international trade 
in differentiated goods, hence restricting the scope of production relocation. To put it 
simply, high trade costs mean not many differentiated goods are being traded to start with. 
Then, the home country cannot export as many. As trade costs become smaller and trade in 
differentiated goods rises, the fact that home firms have a somewhat lower price than 
foreign due to better monetary policy induces the virtuous cycle described above. Recall  
that differentiated goods are both intermediate inputs and part of a new firm entry cost. By 
fostering entry of home firms in differentiated goods, cheaper entry costs ultimately lower 
the home price index. At the other extreme, when trade costs are close to zero, it does not 
matter whether one buys differentiated goods domestically or from abroad; home and 
foreign firms have access to the same set of differentiated goods at the same price, as 
intermediates and/or as components of entry costs.  So it is only for an intermediate range 
of trade costs that the virtuous cycle underlying our main results (the interaction of trade 
cost with intermediates prices and entry costs) becomes large.  
To be clear: the benchmark calibration of the trade cost,  = 0.33, was chosen to 
imply an export-GDP share of 26%, which is the average value for OECD countries 2000-
2017 in World Bank data. The range of  on the horizontal axis of the Figures 3a,b maps 
directly into alternative trade shares. The export share implied by  = 0.3, where the 
relocation effect reaches its maximum, is 27%, which is not so different from the 
benchmark calibration target. However, for the case of no trade cost,  = 0, the export 
share in GDP becomes 55%, which is implausibly high for most countries. For a trade cost 
= 1, the export share falls to 13%, which is the value specific to the case of U.S. data in 
recent years. This level of trade cost implies a substantially smaller, but still noticeable 








Our benchmark model maintains the assumption widespread in the trade literature, 
that the homogeneous good is traded frictionlessly. Figure 4 studies the effects of allowing 
for non-zero trade costs on the non-differentiated good ( ). The figure suggests that the 
home welfare gain when foreign pegs becomes smaller and approaches zero as the trade 
cost for the non-differentiated sector grows relative to that of the differentiated sector. As 
in the trade literature on production relocation, welfare gains arise from the ability to 
reduce the trade costs paid on imported differentiated goods. If trade costs are similar 
across sectors, the welfare gains of specializing in a particular sector are reduced.  
In light of the decisive role of trade costs, it should be clear that a roundabout 
production structure, by which differentiated goods require intermediates in the form of 
other differentiated goods, plays a role in amplifying welfare consequences of relocation. 
Figure 5 shows that the home welfare gain when foreign pegs consistently rises with a 
higher intermediates share. In fact, for an intermediate share of 0.35, just a bit higher than 
our benchmark calibration, the effect on welfare rises to 2%, measured in consumption 
units—an effect that is similar to the one discussed by Epifani and Gancia (2017).  Figure 5 
shows that the home welfare gain rises with yet higher intermediate shares.  
The appendix explores a number of additional robustness experiments which 
required significant modifications in the structure of the model too lengthy to describe in 
the main text. These include a version of the model with a nontraded goods sector, where 
half of differentiated goods varieties cannot be exported. Simulations show the magnitude 
of welfare changes arising from a foreign peg are reduced on average by 37% compared to 
the benchmark model (home welfare rises 0.86% and foreign falls 1.15% relative to 
Ramsey). Given that our mechanism relies upon comparative advantage in trade, the 
presence of nontraded goods reduces the scope for production relocation and the resulting 
welfare effects. The relevance of this case is supported by the fact that nontraded goods 
comprise a substantial share of production in most developed countries. Nonetheless, we 
note that the welfare effects in this case are still a full order of magnitude larger compared 
to standard cases where production relocation is absent (as in column 2 of table 4), or 
where both countries pursue symmetric inflation targeting rules (as in column 3 of table 3). 
We also experimented with an inflation-targeting rule whereby the central bank 
inefficiently targets headline inflation, responding to price changes in non-differentiated 
goods even though this sector has no nominal rigidities. When home applies this policy, it 




destabilizing monetary noise as it makes the home monetary stance respond to movements 
in the flexible price in the non-differentiated good sector. As a result, relative to the 
Ramsey allocation, when the foreign country pegs and the home country targets headline 
inflation, the home country actually suffers a small loss in home comparative advantage in 
the differentiated goods sector: the home differentiated share falls 1.4% and home welfare 
falls 0.53%. This experiment helps with understanding the policy rule in our baseline 
specification of the model. In line with a well-established theoretical result on optimal 
stabilization theory, monetary policy targets only prices which are rigid, that is, targets the 
sectors plagued by nominal frictions. We note that targeting sticky differentiated goods 
inflation also has a counterpart in the practice of monetary policy, in that central banks 
typically motivate their decisions in terms of the dynamics of core inflation, a measure that 
excludes flexible and volatile prices, like commodities, rather than headline inflation.   
 
6.2 Business cycle disturbances 
 To gain further insight into the monetary transmission mechanism, we now consider 
a wider spectrum of sources of international business cycles. To start with, we verify the 
robustness of our results when productivity shocks are correlated across countries, a 
possibility we ruled out in the benchmark calibration. Not surprisingly, our simulations 
indicate that if home and foreign shocks are assumed to be perfectly correlated across 
countries (shocks are global), a foreign peg does not result in any production relocation. 
Specifically, the unconditional means of all variables remain symmetric across countries 
when the foreign pegs its exchange rate and home fully stabilizes differentiated goods 
inflation. The simple reason is that the optimal stabilization policy is symmetric across 
countries. As the foreign country always experiences the same shock as home, the fact that 
a peg requires foreign money supply and interest rates to exactly track home monetary 
policy is by no means less efficient than following a symmetric stabilization rule under 
monetary independence.  
To see how much production relocation occurs under a reasonable degree of 
international correlation of shock, we gather data on an aggregate of European Union 
countries and estimate the shock process for differentiated and non-differentiated goods 
joint with the U.S. data. In other words, we run a first-order vector autoregresion on the 
four series, two for Europe and two for the U.S., and compute the international correlations 
of residuals. Using the result, we set the correlation between home and foreign 
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differentiated goods shocks equal to 0.321, and that between non-differentiated goods 
shocks equal to 0.0793. The cross-sectoral correlation, between differentiated goods in one 
country and non-differentiated goods in the other county is 0.0528. Results from adopting 
this joint productivity shock process are reported in Table 5, column 6. The production 
relocation effect is somewhat diminished but remains substantial, with the home welfare 
rising 1.2% rather than 1.4% relative to the Ramsey solution.     
  Next we extend the analysis including shocks to money demand, consumption 
demand, and tax shocks affecting the markup. We augment the utility function with terms 
to shift the marginal utility of money balances ( ) and consumption ( ):  
. 
To study exogenous variations in firm markups, we adapt the shock specification used in 
Corsetti et al. (2010). Let  represent the fraction of differentiated goods production that is 
surrendered to the government, so that the differentiated goods market clearing condition 
becomes . Similarly for a tax on non-differentiated goods 
production, , market clearing becomes  . It 
is assumed that goods surrendered to the government as tax payments are consumed directly 
by the government, and this yields no household utility. This implies the following pricing 
equations for the two types of goods: 
 
and  . 
From these equations, it is apparent that the tax shocks act like a shock to firm markups.  
All shocks are assumed to follow autoregressive processes in log deviations from 
steady state, orthogonal to other shocks, and orthogonal across countries. The 
parameterization of the tax shock is taken from the estimations of Leeper et al. (2010).29 
                                               
29 The process estimated by Leeper et al. (2010) for capital tax shocks is converted from a quarterly frequency 
to annual frequency by stochastic simulation of the process and then fitting an annual sampling of the 
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Parameterization of the consumption taste shock is taken from Stockman and Tesar (1995), 
and that of the money demand shock is taken from Bergin et al. (2007).30 
 Results are reported in Table 5. Column 2 shows that shocks to money demand are 
not relevant: under the monetary regimes considered in either of our experiments, any rise 
in money demand is automatically matched by a rise in money supply. This is true under 
both inflation stabilization and under a peg, as well as under the Ramsey solution. 
Simulations confirm that the mean number of firms and differentiated export share are 
unaffected, and so are the other variables in the model. Indeed, this type of shock could be 
potentially consequential for firms’ entry only under monetary regimes, such as a constant 
money growth rule, that would fall short of insulating aggregate demand from destabilizing 
liquidity shocks, inducing a positive covariance between demand and marginal costs. 
 Shocks to consumption tastes, in column 3, are found to have similar effects as 
productivity shocks, but are one to two orders of magnitude smaller. In the presence of 
taste shocks, a foreign peg discourages foreign entry in the differentiated goods sector and 
thereby encourages entry in the home country (that stabilizes inflation), but the magnitudes 
are very small. 
 Tax shocks instead cause firm entry and welfare to decline in both countries, more 
so at home than foreign. This reflects the findings in other studies (as reviewed in Corsetti 
et al. 2010), that cost push shocks introduce a significant trade-off between inflation and 
output gap stabilization, which is not necessarily optimized under inflation targeting. This 
underscores that what matters for production relocation is not inflation targeting per se, but 
a stabilization policy which is effective in stabilizing markups and therefore facilitating 
investment in new firms. One key lesson from the literature is that the optimal design of 
stabilization policy may depend on the mix of shocks. 
 We conclude with an experiment combining all four shocks, shown in column (5). 
The overall effects on export shares and welfare are close to the sum of the effects under 
productivity and tax shocks treated separately earlier in the table. Relative to Ramsey, the 
home country has higher welfare, the foreign lower welfare, but the home gain is smaller 
than under the benchmark model with productivity shocks only.   
                                               
deviation of shocks of 0.0790 are applied to tax shocks in each country and each sector. These shocks are 
assumed orthogonal to each other. The mean level of this tax, 0.184, also is taken from Leeper et al. (2010).  
30 We follow the first experiment of Stockman and Tesar (1995), in parameterizing a shock to overall 
consumption with standard deviation 2.5 times that of productivity, and with the same autoregressive 
parameter as productivity. We follow Bergin et al. (2007) in setting the standard deviation of the money 





According to a widespread view in policy and academic circles, monetary and 
exchange rate policy has the power to favor, or hinder, the competitiveness of domestic 
producers, mainly by affecting the level of the exchange rate. This paper revisits the 
received wisdom on this issue, exploring a new direction for open-economy monetary 
models. Our argument is that what matters is the firms’ production and investment 
response to macroeconomic stabilization regimes, rather than the response to specific 
measures depreciating (or failing to depreciate) the exchange rate in the short run.  
It is widely accepted that monetary policy may have differential effects across 
sectors. Building on this observation, we work out a model to explore potential effects of 
monetary policy on the comparative advantage of a country in producing goods with the 
characteristics (high upfront investment, monopoly power and nominal frictions) typical of 
manufacturing. Our main conclusion is that a stabilization regime delivering an efficient 
stabilization of the output gap (and marginal costs) can strengthen a country’s comparative 
advantage in the production of these goods beyond the short run.  
To be clear, an efficient stabilization policy requires contingent expansions and 
contractions, which may foster but also reduce the international price competitiveness of a 
country ex post. Our results suggest that, depending on these state-contingent responses to 
business cycle shocks, monetary stabilization may affect the comparative advantage of a 
country in a way that is separate from the prescription of pro-competitive devaluations 
familiar from traditional policy models. By stabilizing demand and markups, an efficient 
stabilization policy may foster entry in sectors where firms’ value is more sensitive to 
uncertainty, essentially because of the combination of high upfront costs and nominal 
rigidities. Failing to stabilize demand, on the contrary, may discourage entry and 
production in these sectors. 
As our conclusions point to medium to long-run non-neutrality of money, we 
should stress that they are perfectly in line with the classical literature. In the classic 
literature stressing the shoe-leather costs of inflation, an inefficient monetary policy (failing 
to deliver low inflation) has steady state effects, in that it magnifies wasteful costs of cash 
management at household and firm level. In the new Keynesian literature, suboptimal 
policy creates price dispersion that has real misallocation costs in the medium to the long 
run. In the same vein, we call attention to a different, potentially consequential implication 
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of policies that fail to stabilize the output gap in terms of their adverse medium-term effects 
on the structure of production and exports. 
To illustrate our point, we focus our analysis on the inefficiency of currency pegs, 
but our results generalize to other forms of inefficiency due to constraints on monetary 
policy (a secular stagnation), or suboptimal rules (such as non-contingent money growth 
rules). Nevertheless, we should highlight that our study of unilateral pegs bears relevant 
lessons for asymmetric monetary unions, whereas the common policy stance may not be 
appropriate from individual member states’ perspectives. One lesson is straightforward. 
Experience suggests that member states may try to enter a union at a competitive level of 
the exchange rate, that temporarily enhances external demand (but also feeds price and 
hence inflation adjustment). Over time, nonetheless, the loss of monetary independence and 
the exchange rate as adjustment margin is bound to affect the production structure and 
competitiveness, unless the country activates alternative policy instruments that can make 
up for such a loss and deliver efficient stabilization. If anything, our results strengthen the 
case for fiscal policy and reform in the product, labor and credit markets as a precondition 
for a successful monetary union. 
Finally, this paper contributes an important result to the New Keynesian literature. 
One of the key findings from this literature is that monetary policy trades off output gap 
stabilization with stronger terms of trade. In our model, we show how this trade-off is 
inherent in monetary models featuring comparative advantage. To the extent that efficient 
stabilization makes manufacturing more competitive, this results in a shift in the sectoral 
allocation of resources and composition of exports. It is this shift that improves the 
country’s overall terms of trade, even if the international price of domestic manufacturing 
falls. Overall, the theory developed in this paper points to new promising directions for 
integrating trade and macro models and brings the literature closer to addressing core 
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Table 1. Benchmark Parameter Values 
Preferences 
 Risk aversion  
 Time preference =0.96 
 Labor supply elasticity  
 Differentiated goods share  
 Non-differentiated goods home bias  
 Differentiated goods elasticity  = 5.2 
 Non-differentiated goods elasticity  
 
Technology 
 Firm death rate  
 Price stickiness  
 Intermediate input share  
 Differentiated goods trade cost =0.33 
 Non-differentiated goods trade cost =0 
 Mean sunk entry cost = 1 
 Firm entry adjustment cost  
 Bond holding cost  =0.001 
 
Monetary Policy (for the historical policy rule): 
 Interest rate smoothing =0.7  
 Inflation response =1.7 
 GDP response =0.1 
  
Shocks:  











GDP 2.07 2.49 
as ratios to std. dev. of GDP: 
Firm creation 5.53 4.06 
Consumption 0.75 0.29 
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Table 3. Means: Comparison Across Policy Regimes 
 























unconditional means of variables:     
 0.551 -0.320 -0.354 0.061 3.930 
 0.551 -0.318 -0.354 -0.640 -4.580 
n 0.409 0.832 2.045 1.193 8.299 
n* 0.409 0.835 2.045 -0.292 -6.772 
yD 1.472 -0.091 -0.051 0.101 2.287 
yH 1.772 0.870 1.214 0.209 -4.771 
yD* 1.472 -0.090 -0.051 -0.265 -2.338 
yF* 1.772 0.868 1.215 1.152 6.416 
C 0.583 -0.002 0.136 0.047 0.827 
C* 0.583 -0.002 0.136 -0.103 -0.800 
l 1.371 0.092 0.031 -0.011 -0.843 
l* 1.371 0.092 0.031 0.192 0.942 
p(h) 1.546 0.151 0.307 0.157 0.771 
p*(f) 1.546 0.152 0.307 0.031 -0.532 
W 0.401 0.068 0.326 0.110 1.240 
W* 0.401 0.068 0.326 -0.090 -1.101 
markup 0.238 0.013 0.011 0.029 0.011 
markup* 0.238 0.013 0.011 -0.054 0.098 
p(h)/PN 3.866 0.230 0.250 0.161 -0.284 
p*(f)/PN* 3.866 0.229 0.250 0.221 0.716 
pD 1.801 0.506 0.622 0.388 0.069 
pD* 1.801 0.506 0.622 0.436 0.725 
RER 1.001 0.181 0.257 0.221 1.178 
TOTM 1.000 -0.021 0.002 0.014 0.231 
TOTS 1.061 12.014 17.154 10.090 18.653 
Welfare relative to Ramsey policy, percent difference in consumption units, conditional on 
initial conditions  
total   -0.246 -0.041 -0.259 -0.202 
home   -0.246 -0.041 -0.105 1.390 
foreign   -0.246 -0.041 -0.412 -1.807 
 
        
Results from a second-order approximation to the model. represents the share of differentiated goods in 
overall exports of the home country, computed as  ;  
represents the counterpart for the foreign country. Since  and  are in percentage form already, the 
table reports differences from Ramsey policy for these two variables in units of percentage points. Home 
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Table 4. Alternative Model Specifications 
(percent difference of foreign peg from Ramsey)   




















    (n=n*=0.41) (q = 1) (n = 1): (qK = 1) (yB =1000)   
Welfare:        
  Home 1.390 -0.144 0.072 0.042 0.078 1.492 1.370 
  Foreign -1.807 -0.190 -0.232 -0.247 -0.163 -1.957 -1.641 
  Total -0.202 -0.167 -0.080 -0.103 -0.042 -0.226 -0.477 
Diff. goods export share: 
  Home 3.930 -0.134 0.000 0.000 0.728 8.212 6.126 
  Foreign -4.580 -0.019 0.000 0.000 0.213 -8.358 -6.441 
Welfare computed as percent difference from Ramsey case, in units of steady state consumption, conditional on 
Ramsey policy allocation as initial conditions. Differentiated goods share of exports (  and ) are in percentage 
form already, so the table reports differences from Ramsey policy in units of percentage points. Values based on 




Table 5. Alternative Shocks  
(percent difference of foreign peg from Ramsey)  











Welfare:       
  Home 1.390 0.000 0.012 -1.113 0.363 1.174 
  Foreign -1.807 0.000 -0.055 -0.236 -2.113 -1.409 
  Total -0.202 0.000 -0.022 -0.674 -0.871 -0.114 
Diff. goods export share:    
  Home 3.930 0.000 0.057 -6.318 4.494 3.260 
  Foreign -4.580 0.000 -0.116 -0.065 -3.421 -3.761 
 
       
Welfare computed as percent difference from Ramsey case, in units of steady state consumption, 
conditional on Ramsey policy allocation as initial conditions. Differentiated goods share of exports 
(  and ) are in percentage form already, so the table reports differences from Ramsey policy in 
units of percentage points. Values based on unconditional means from simulation of second order 
approximation of the model. 
 

























































Figure 2. Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation rise in home manufacturing 




Vertical axis is percent deviation (0.01=1%) from steady state levels. Horizontal axis is 




Figure 3a. Effect of trade cost of differentiated goods 
on the home welfare gain from foreign peg 
 
 
Home welfare gain is percentage difference from Ramsey policy welfare, in 





Figure 3b. Effect of trade cost of differentiated goods 
on numbers of firms 
  
 
Home welfare gain is percentage difference from Ramsey policy welfare, in 
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Figure 4. Effect of trade cost of non-differentiated goods 




Home welfare gain is percentage difference from Ramsey policy welfare, in 
consumption units.  
 
 
Figure 5. Effect of intermediate input share 
on the home welfare gain from foreign peg 
   
 
Home welfare gain is percentage difference from Ramsey policy welfare, in 
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Supplementary Online Appendix 
 
1. Demand equations not listed in text 
The composition of expenditure on adjustment costs, both for prices and bond holding, 
follows the same preferences as for consumption, and the associated demands mirror 
equations (4)-(9). Adjustment costs for bond holding are as follows: 
    
   
    
The economy-wide demand for goods arising from price adjustment costs sums across 
the demand arising among n home firms: . This is allocated as follows:  
   
   
   
 
 
2. Entry condition 
The single-period version of the entry condition (25) is: 
. 
Combine with the single-period version of the profit function (24), in which the dynamic 
adjustment cost (ACp,t(h)) is set to zero, and simplify: 
 
Under producer currency pricing of exports: 
 
Using demand equations for CM,t and ct(h), as well as definition of PM,t: 
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Under log utility, where  and , this becomes equation (46). 
 
 
3. Entry under full stabilization 
Substitute prices, ,  and policy rules ( ) into 
(46) and simplify: 
Impose symmetry across countries: 
 
 
Which is the same as for the flexible price case. 
 
To compare to the no stabilization case, write this as 
 
Note that . However  switches from a concave function of
 to a convex function near the symmetric steady state value of . 
Hence we cannot apply Jensen’s inequality to determine whether . This finding 
reflects the fact that the effects of symmetric stabilization are small. Our analysis, 
nonetheless, will show that the effects of asymmetric stabilization can be large. 
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4. Case of fixed exchange rate rule  
Substitute prices and policy rules ( ) into (46): 
Pass through expectations and simplify 
 
 
Do the same for the foreign entry condition: 
 
Rewrite the home and foreign conditions as fractions: 
Home:    
Foreign:  
Where we define: 
  




Note that the denominator will be negative provided the standard deviation of shocks is 
small relative to the iceberg costs, which will be true for all our cases: 
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For shocks independently log normally distributed with standard deviation  so that
. For example, with =0.1 and =6,  must be less than 0.209. Our 
calibration of  is 0.017.   
 
 
For independent log normal distributions of productivity: 
   
We can conclude that nt>nt*. 
 
 
5. Local currency pricing (LCP) model specification 
Under the specification that prices for domestic sales, , and exports, , 
are set separately in the currencies of the buyers, the Rotemberg price setting equations for 
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6 . Additional sensitivity analysis 
6.1. Elasticity between differentiated and non-differentiated goods 
The benchmark model implies a unitary elasticity between differentiated and non-
differentiated goods. We can generalize the aggregator to a CES specification, with 
elasticity : 
. 
Figure A1 below shows the effect of alternative assumptions about the elasticity  on 
home welfare gain when the foreign country pegs and home targets inflation, relative to the 
Ramsey solution. The home welfare gain is reduced as the two goods become more 
complementary, and it rises as they become more substitutable, although the range is 
limited where Ramsey can be solved numerically in the latter case.    
 
Figure A1: Effect of elasticity of substitution between sectors 
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6.2. Endogenous tradedness of goods 
The benchmark model makes the standard assumption in the trade literature on 
production relocation, that all differentiated goods are traded, and the relevant entry 
decision is whether a potential entrant should pay the sunk cost of firm creation.  We 
consider here an alternative model where the entry decision instead is whether to export, 
where those firms that do not export continue to produce for just the domestic market as 
nontraded varieties.  
The new model assumes a fixed unit mass of differentiated goods producers in each 
country, and nt becomes the fraction of domestic firms that choose to become exporters. 
For those firms that choose to be nonexporters, the sales abroad for their varieties are set to 
zero ( , defined from the counterpart of equation (22) in the text). Firm profits and 
firm valuations are defined accordingly. For exporters, the specifications of demand for 
their exports, profits, and firm valuations are the same as in the benchmark model. Firms 
choose to be an exporter when the firm value of being an exporter minus that of being a 
nonexporter equals the sunk export entry cost. The sunk cost is calibrated to imply the 
same ratio of exports to GDP as in the benchmark model (implying  = 0.126). This 
implies that  29% of domestic firms choose to become exporters, which is a standard value 
in the literature. 
Simulations in Appendix Table A1 indicate that the production relocation effect is 
very small, and there is only a small welfare gain for the home country that stabilizes 
inflation when the foreign country pegs. The main effect of the foreign peg is that both 
countries lose firms and welfare compared to the Ramsey policy. The reason is that if 
tradability is endogenous but not the location of production, then the production relocation 
effect cannot have its full effect. The scope for comparative advantage to shape domestic 
production is very limited if domestic firms are not forced to leave the market.  It is 
possible that the effects of production relocation might be restored if there were also a sunk 
cost of domestic entry as well as exporting. However, two simultaneous sunk costs would 
greatly multiply the complexity of solution, as firms might pay the sunk cost of domestic 
firm creation in order to secure the option of future export entry under particular 







Table A1. Models with nontraded goods  






Welfare:   
  Home -0.290 0.856 
  Foreign -0.591 -1.179 
  Total -0.440 -0.165 
Diff. goods export share: 
  Home -7.678 4.478   
  Foreign -7.822 -4.643  
 
6.3. Exogenously nontraded goods 
Even if tradedness is not endogenous, the presence of nontraded goods could limit 
the relocation mechanism driving our result by reducing the scope for comparative 
advantage. We propose another variant of the model where half of the differentiated goods 
varieties are defined as nontradable. In this model, the nontradable and tradable sectors 
both consist of differentiated goods producers, but each subsector is handled independently. 
There is a mass of  differentiated goods firms that both export and sell domestically, and 
there is mass  domestic firms that sell only to the domestic market. The tradable firms 
face a sunk cost entry decision identical to that in the benchmark model. The nontraded 
firms are assumed to be of a constant mass and do not face an entry decision, but their 
number is calibrated as half of the number of firms in the benchmark model (  = 0.2). 
This restriction was required by the fact that both sectors face the same demands for their 
varieties in the home market, since they face the same marginal costs and price stickiness. 
If they were subject to the same sunk entry cost, then there is no solution that supports both 
an endogenous number of domestic firms and export firms, where the firm value of the 
latter is necessarily greater than the former. We adopt the local currency pricing 
specification of price stickiness discussed in the text, as this allows us to model a single set 
of prices for both sets of firms when selling domestically.  
This model is calibrated with the same sunk entry cost as in the benchmark model. 
The steady state shows that approximately half the differentiated goods varieties are not 
traded, and half of domestic consumption of differentiated goods is of nontraded varieties. 
But the smaller number of differentiated goods varieties export a proportionately larger 
quantity of output, so that the share of exports in overall GDP is the same as in the 
benchmark model.  
Results in appendix Table A1 indicate that the magnitude of welfare changes 






model (home welfare rises 0.86% and foreign falls 1.15% relative to Ramsey). Given that 
our mechanism relies upon comparative advantage in trade, the presence of nontraded 
goods reduces the scope for production relocation and the resulting welfare effects. The 
relevance of this case is supported by the fact that nontraded goods comprise a substantial 
share of production in most developed countries. Nonetheless, we note that the welfare 
effects in this case are still a full order of magnitude larger compared to standard cases 
where production relocation is absent (as in column 2 of table 4), or where both countries 
pursue symmetric inflation targeting rules (as in column 3 of table 3).  
 
6.4. Investment in physical capital 
In this version of the model, we introduce investment in physical capital, to investigate 
whether standard capital accumulation can replace the sunk entry cost of firm entry in 
generating the production relocation effect.  In this version of the model firm entry is 
suspended and the number of firms in each country is fixed.   
Consumers invest in new capital subject to quadratic adjustment costs. They earn a 
competitive rate of return, 𝑟#, while capital depreciates at rate 𝛿.  The household budget 
constraint becomes: 
𝑃#𝐶# + (𝑀# − 𝑀#+,) + (𝐵/,# − 𝐵/,#+,) + 𝑒#(𝐵2,# − 𝐵2,#+,) = 
𝑊#𝑙# + Π# + 𝑖#+,𝐵/,#+, + 𝑖#+,⋆ 𝐵2,#+, − 𝑃#𝐴𝐶:,# − 𝑇# + 𝑟#𝐾#+, − 𝐼# − 𝐴𝐶>,#. 







𝐼# = 𝐾# − 𝐾#+,(1 − 𝛿). 




M𝑟#N, + 1 − 𝛿 + 𝜓P J
(Q>CLE)F
B
+ Δ𝐾#N,STS = 1 + 𝜓PΔ𝐾#, 
where Δ𝐾# = (𝐾# − 𝐾#+,)/𝐾#+, and 𝜇# is the inverse of the nominal marginal utility. 
The firm problem is different in two ways. First, the firm minimizes cost with capital 
as a new input. Second, we drop the entry condition when the firm chooses prices. Output 
becomes a function of capital, and marginal costs are similar to before but now incorporate 












where the last equation comes from cost minimization. Investment is funded from 
differentiated goods so that the new market clearing condition in the home country for the 
individual firm is:  
𝑑#(ℎ) = 𝑐#(ℎ) + 𝑑m,#(ℎ) + 𝑑no,g,#(ℎ) + 𝑑no,:,#(ℎ) + 𝑑>,#(ℎ) + 𝑑no,>,#(ℎ). 
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The difference here are the last two terms, 𝑑>,#(ℎ) and 𝑑no,>,#(ℎ), which are demand for new 
investment goods and demand for the differentiated goods to cover adjustment costs.  These 













From the firm’s optimization problem, we can now update the expression for Ω# from 













f𝐶z,#⋆ + 𝐺#⋆ + 𝑛𝑒#⋆(1 − 𝜃P)𝐾#⋆ + 𝐴𝐶g,z,#⋆ + 𝐴𝐶:,z,#⋆ + 𝐴𝐶>,#⋆ + 𝐼#⋆i~ /𝜇#. 
The number of firms, 𝑛#, is now fixed so that 𝑛# = 𝑛#⋆ = 0.4. We then set new entry to 
zero.  Simulations use standard values for the new parameters: 𝜓P = 0.05, 𝛿 = 0.06, 𝛾 = 0.3. 
Simulation results indicate that this model does not generate a large production 
relocation effect. Assuming policies where the foreign country pegs the exchange rate while 
the home country fully stabilizes differentiated goods producer price inflation, the home share 
of differentiated goods in exports rises only 0.039 percentage points, and the foreign share 
falls just 0.005 percentage points, relative to a case where both countries fully target 
differentiated goods inflation. These values work in the same direction as the results from the 
benchmark model simulation, but they are two orders of magnitude smaller. This result serves 
simply to reiterate the claim in the main text that the large production reallocation effect in the 
benchmark model depends crucially upon endogenous firm entry in the differentiated goods 
sector, in order to facilitate a large production reallocation of sectors between countries. 
 
6.5. Calvo price stickiness 
Under Calvo pricing, demand for the differentiated goods, 𝑑#(ℎ), must satisfy:  
𝑑#(ℎ) = 𝑐#(ℎ) + 𝑑m,#(ℎ) + 𝑑no,:,#(ℎ) + 𝑑>,#(ℎ). 







where Δ# = 𝐶z,# + 𝐺# + 𝐴𝐶:,z,# + 𝐴𝐶>,# + 𝑛𝑒#(1 − 𝜃P)𝐾#. The foreign country has Δ#⋆ =
𝐶z,#⋆ + 𝐺#⋆ + 𝐴𝐶:,z,#⋆ + 𝐴𝐶>,#⋆ + 𝑛𝑒#⋆(1 − 𝜃P)𝐾#⋆. Total output of variety ℎ is then 𝑦#(ℎ) =














From here onward, we let Δ# be the second term on the right in parenthesis, so that  






Using this demand function in the optimization problem for the firm, allowing share 1 − 𝜌 of 














Because share 𝜌 of firms are locked into the price they set today, and share 1 − 𝜌 is 
able to readjust and set prices at 𝑝##, aggregating across all firms we arrive at the average price 
for domestically sold differentiated goods, 𝑝#r:  
f𝑝#ri
,+u = (1 − 𝜌)(𝑝##),+u + 𝜌f𝑝#+,r i
,+u. 











Using the definition for the domestic price of the foreign differentiated good,  
𝑝#
 = 𝑒#(1 + 𝜏z)𝑝#
,⋆. 
Using the price together with the domestic price, we arrive at the price index for domestic and 






















Since technology is identical across firms and returns to scale are constant, this yields:  
𝛼z,#f𝐺#
[if𝑙z,#
,+[i = 𝑛#+,𝑣q,#Δ#, 








Integrating, we can write this in terms of 𝜋z,# and 𝜋z,## , which are defined respectively as 
𝜋z,# = 𝑃z,#/𝑃z,#+, and 𝜋z,## = 𝑝##/𝑃z,#+,. The price dispersion is  







Using this expression, we now replace the variety-specific demands (differentiated by 
ℎ) with average demands across varieties. To arrive at the average demand across varieties for 
the various uses of the differentiated good, we simply integrate with respect to ℎ and divide by 
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the number of firms. For example, defining the average consumption of differentiated goods 


















𝐶z,#𝑑ℎ = 𝑣q,#𝐶z,#. 
Doing the same to demand across all uses for differentiated goods, i.e. 𝑑m,#(ℎ), 
𝑑no,:,#(ℎ), and 𝑑>,#(ℎ), the average demands are,  
𝑑¤m,# = 𝑣q,#𝐺>,# 
𝑑¤no,:,# = 𝑣q,#𝐴𝐶:,# 
𝑑¤>,# = 𝑣q,#𝑛𝑒#(1 − 𝜃P)𝐾#. 
We use these expressions to replace demand for variety ℎ with average demand across all 
varieties. This change has no material impact on the steady state or even the entry condition 
for firms into the differentiated goods sector, as we assume that firms choose to enter or not 
before they learn if they are able to set prices for that period.  In experiments we set parameter 
𝜌 = 0.5. 
Simulation results indicate that this model produces results very similar to the 
benchmark model with Rotemberg pricing, if we retain the feature of free entry of firms into 
the differentiated goods sector. Assuming policies where the foreign country pegs the 
exchange rate while the home country fully stabilizes differentiated goods producer price 
inflation, the home share of differentiated goods in exports rises by 3.33  percentage points, 
and the foreign share falls a similar 3.41 percentage points, relative to a case where both 
countries fully target differentiated goods inflation. This production relocation is facilitated by 
a shift in the location of firms, with a rise in the number of home firms by 6.26 percent, and 
fall in the number of foreign firms by 5.12 percent.  
When firm entry is eliminated from the model and the number of firms is exogenously 
fixed, the production relocation effects becomes very small. A foreign peg raises the home 
share of differentiated goods by just 0.018 percentage points and lowers foreign share by 
0.038 percentage points. These values have the same sign as the benchmark model, but the 
values are two orders of magnitude smaller. Again, this reiterates the point that the production 
relocation effect depends crucially upon endogenous firm entry.  
 
